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UNLIMITED LIABILITY FOR AIR PASSENGERS: THE
POSITION OF CARRIERS, PASSENGERS, TRAVEL
AGENTS AND TOUR OPERATORS UNDER THE IATA
PASSENGER LIABILITY AGREEMENT SCHEME
TREVOR ATHERTON*
I. INTRODUCTION
ATA HAS BYPASSED the inertia of inter-governmental multi-
lateral negotiations and has introduced a radical scheme to
reform several key problems of the Warsaw System. In 1995,
IATA obtained unanimous approval from its member carriers
for the Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA).
The preamble to the agreement acknowledged that although
the "Warsaw Convention system is of great benefit to interna-
tional air transportation" the "Convention's limits of liability,
which have not been amended since 1955, are now grossly inad-
equate in most countries."'
A. IIA
Under the IIA, the carriers agreed:
(1) To undertake action to waive the limitation of liability on
recoverable compensatory damages in Article 22 paragraph 1 of
the Warsaw Convention as to claims for death, wounding or
other bodily injury of a passenger within the meaning of Article
17 of the Convention so that recoverable compensatory damages
may be determined and awarded by reference to the law of the
domicile of the passenger.
(2) To reserve all available defenses pursuant to the provisions
of the Convention; nevertheless, any carrier may waive any de-
fense, including any defense up to a specified monetary amount
* B. Com., L.L.B. (Honors), M.S.C. (Tourism Management), L.L.M. (Tourism
Law); Lawyer Australia, England, Wales, Cambodia; Director, Centre for Tourism
Law and Policy, Bond University; Consultant to Baker & McKenzie, Sydney.
I IATA Intercarrier Agreement on Passenger Liability, pmbl., Oct. 31, 1995
[hereinafter IIA].
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Following approval of the European Union (EU) and United
States' regulatory authorities, the Agreement on Measures to
Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement (MIA) was de-
clared effective on February 14, 1997. Under the MIA, signatory
carriers4 agree to incorporate into their conditions of carriage
and tariffs the following provisions:
I. [Mandatory]
(1) [The carrier] shall not invoke the limitation of liability
in Article 22(1) of the Convention as to any claim for
recoverable compensatory damages arising under Arti-
cle 17 of the Convention.
(2) [The carrier] shall not avail itself of any defense under
Article 20 (1) of the Convention with respect to that por-
tion of such claim which does not exceed 100,000 SDR
• * , [II. (2) provides the option of setting different lim-
its for different routes subject to government approval]
(3) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs 1 and 2
hereof, [the carrier] reserves all defenses available
under the Convention to any such claim ...
II. [Optional]
(1) [The carrier] agrees that subject to applicable law, re-
coverable compensatory damages for such claims may
be determined by reference to the law of the domicile
or permanent residence of the passenger.
This Article examines the impact of the scheme on carriers,
passengers, and intermediaries, such as travel agents and tour
operators. It finds that although the scheme has adopted an
innovative self-regulatory approach to introducing long overdue
reforms, further work is required to ensure that it achieves its
2 Id. 1 & 2.
" For an analysis of the issues in the U.S. Department of Transportation ap-
proval see A.J. Harakas, The Status of the Warsaw Convention Limits on Liability-The
International Air Transport Association and Air Transport Association of America File
Applications with the U.S. DOT for Approval of the Intercarrier Agreement and Implement-
ing Agreement of Passenger Liability, THE AVIATION QUARTERLY, Oct. 1996, at 115-
123.
4 Forty-seven carriers have signed. For an updated list see the IATA home
page: <http://www.iata.org/>.
5 Agreement on Measures to Implement the IATA Intercarrier Agreement,
May 1996, pts. I and II [hereinafter MIA].
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objectives for carriers and passengers and does not expose inno-
cent travel agents and tour operators to unlimited liability for
the safety of air transport.
II. WARSAW SYSTEM
A. WARSAW CONVENTION 1929
Air carriers' liability is generally determined by the principles
of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to In-
ternational Transportation by Air (Warsaw Convention 1929),
which was signed at Warsaw in 1929 and came into force on Feb-
ruary 13, 1933.6 It has been ratified by 127 countries and, in this
respect, is the world's most successful private law treaty.7
The original objectives of the Warsaw Convention were to
achieve international uniformity in air carriers' liability and doc-
umentation for air transportation.8 It introduced a uniform sys-
tem of strict but limited liability for passengers, baggage,9 and
cargo. Uniformity was desirable to facilitate transactions across
borders, languages and cultures, and to avoid interminable con-
flicts of law problems. Liability was made strict to avoid the
problems of proving fault and to compensate for the imposition
of limits on claims. It was argued that it was necessary to limit
claims, otherwise, a single disaster could bankrupt a carrier and
insurance would be too expensive for carriers or for passengers
if added to the price of each ticket. Advances in technology,
safety, and insurance have undermined the latter arguments,
and the Warsaw System has evolved through a series of in-
creased limits to various attempts to remove the limits
altogether. 10
6 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
7 See H. Caplan, Modernizing the Warsaw System: A Protocol on New Convention,
THE AVIATION QUARTERLY, Oct. 1996, at 138.
8 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, pmbl.
9 The term "baggage" rather than "luggage" is used throughout the Warsaw
Convention, CACLA, and IATA Resolutions and air travel documentation
although the two terms appear to have identical meanings.
10 See E. GIEMULLA ET AL., WARSAW CONVENTION, Introduction (Kluwer Law
Int'l).
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B. KEY AMENDMENTS: HAGUE PROTOCOL OF 1955,
GUADALAJARA CONVENTION 1961
There was no mechanism in the Warsaw Convention to in-
crease the limits in order to keep abreast of inflation and other
facto'rs. However, as inflation devalued the limits in real terms,
the aviation industry spread to more and more diverse countries
so that it became more difficult to achieve consensus among na-
tions regarding revised limits. Sufficient consensus was reached
under the Hague Protocol of 1955, which doubled the limits
under for the wide acceptance of the Warsaw Convention and
amended it to solve various other problems that had emerged."
The Guadalajara Supplementary Convention of 1961 (Guada-
lajara Convention) further amended the Warsaw System to
cover journeys performed by several carriers (interlining) and
provided that passengers could sue either the contracting car-
rier or the actual carrier or both, but the total liability remained
subject to the limits.' 2
There have been numerous other proposals and schemes to
increase or avoid the limits on liability. Many of these are found
in various other agreements, conventions, and protocols. Thus,
the "uniform" Warsaw System now varies from country to coun-
try, depending upon which of these have been adopted. Liabil-
ity also varies from carrier to carrier as the Warsaw System leaves
carriers free to accept higher limits.
To restore uniformity and overcome objections to the limits,
IATA brokered the agreement for the new scheme among its
member carriers.
C. WARSAW SYSTEM: WORLD OVERVIEW
Despite its original objective of unification, the Warsaw Sys-
tem has become increasingly fragmented, and it has become im-
possible to reach a new consensus. The following world
overview highlights the fragmentation in the present system.
11 The United States was the nation most dissatisfied with the low limits and it
refused to endorse the Hague Protocol because it considered the doubled limits
too low. Instead, by threat of denunciation of the Warsaw System altogether, it
forced international carriers to enter the Montreal Agreement of 1966, which
provided for special liability limits for carriers with a U.S. stopover. These are per
passenger US $75,000 inclusive or US $58,000 exclusive of legal fees.
12 See Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Prerformed by a Person Other
than the Contracting Carrier, Sept. 18, 1961, art. IV, 500 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Guadalajara Convention].
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Number of Parties
Instrument Countries/Carriers Date in Force
Warsaw Convention 1929 127 2/13/33
Hague Protocol 1955 113 8/1/63
Guadalajara Convention 1963 71 5/1/64
Guatemala City Protocol 1971 11 (30 ratifications
required)
Montreal Additional Protocols 1975
No. 1 28 (30 ratifications
required)
No. 2 29 (30 ratifications
required)
No. 3 21 (30 ratifications
required)
Montreal Protocol No. 4 1975 26 (30 ratifications
required)
IATA Intercarrier Agreement on 66+ 10/31/95
Passenger Liability
Agreement to Implement IATA 47 2/14/97
Intercarrier Agreement
Aviation is one of the world's most dynamic industries. When
it takes over twenty years to achieve the required number of rati-
fications, circumstances change so much that the proposed re-
form is overtaken and outmoded long before it can be
implemented. 4 It is not surprising that the industry has aban-
doned the traditional process and has developed its own re-
forms, albeit within the framework of the Warsaw System under
the IATA scheme.
Nevertheless, as seen from the discussion below, the problems
cannot all be solved contractually by the private sector, and the
Montreal Protocols contain essential reforms that have received
substantial, but as yet insufficient, support to come into force.15
13 Compiled by author from data provided by the Australian Department of
Transport Aviation Policy Division, Canberra (Apr. 1997) and IATA Web Site
(visited Feb. 14, 1997) <http://www.iata.org>.
14 For a discussion of the current position of the Warsaw System see Caplan,
supra note 7, at 132-37.
15 See Additional Protocols to Amend Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 25, 1975, 22 I.L.M. 1,3
[hereinafter Montreal Protocols].
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III. LIMITS ON LIABILITY
A. MULTILATERAL AND UNILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS
Under the Warsaw System, although liability is strict16 or pre-
sumed, the amount recoverable has traditionally been limited.
The 1929 convention contained no mechanism for automatic
review of the limits, and subsequent multilateral efforts have
failed to reach general agreement on the issue. The Hague Pro-
tocol doubled the original limits, but even this was not sufficient
for the United States which, instead, made its own special ar-
rangement with carriers. 7 Subsequently, many other countries
have made their own special arrangements for higher limits. 8
Multilateral efforts by government have failed to restore uni-
formity. The inter-governmental multilateral negotiation pro-
cess is so slow that it becomes self-defeating. In the time
required to reach consensus, the new limits become inadequate.
This is the problem with the Montreal Protocols of 1975. They
have not yet come into force despite providing for a general in-
crease to 100,000 SDR, and the limit is already out of date.' 9
B. SPECIAL CONTRACTS
The Warsaw System made provision for another approach to
this problem. Article 22(1) provides that the carrier may, by
special contract, agree upon a higher limit of liability for the
passenger. 0 Many carriers used this method to provide higher
limits to their passengers and, until recently, this method led to
further diversity in the system. IATA, with the unanimous sup-
port of its carrier members, has now used this method to intro-
duce its scheme to reform the limits and restore uniformity.
Under the IATA scheme, carriers that are party to the MIA ac-
cept strict liability to 100,000 SDR per passenger and unlimited
presumed liability.
l6 The "best endeavors" defense under Article 20 makes what is otherwise strict
liability, presumed liability. In the United States, under the Montreal Agreement
of 1966, carriers agreed to waive this defense.
17 See Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air, Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [here-
inafter Hague Protocol]. The Montreal Agreement raised the limit for carriers to
US $75,000 per passenger for the United States.
18 US $75,000 in the United States; US $150,000 in most of Europe; 260,000
SDR in Australia.
19 See Montreal Protocols, supra note 15.
20 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22.
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C. TABLE OF LIMITS
The limits on liability can now be summarized as represented
in the following table (excluding higher limits imposed in spe-
cific countries).
Limits on Carrier Liability
Passengers Baggage
Registered Carry on
Warsaw Convention 21 125,000 francs 2 2  250 francs/kg 5,000 francs
Warsaw/Hague 23  250,000 francs 250 francs/kg 5,000 francs
IATA Intercarrier Agreement
24
Strict liability25  100,000 SDR
Presumed liability2 6  unlimited
IV. REFORMS UNDER THE IATA SCHEME
A. SUMMARY OF REFORMS
The LATA Passenger Agreements reform the Warsaw System
in the following key ways:
0 Uniform strict liability of 100,000 SDR per passenger. This
involves waiver of the Article 22 per passenger limits27 and the
Article 20 best endeavors defense28 up to this limit;
21 Id.
22 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention provides that these francs are deemed
to refer to a currency unit consisting of 65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal
fineness 900. Article 22 provides that this is converted into national currency at
the exchange rate prevailing on the date of the judgment. The problem is that
the gold standard has been abandoned and replaced by the International
Monetary Fund's unit, the Special Drawing Right (SDR), which has been made
the exclusive reserve currency for transaction among IMF States. The SDR is
defined in terms of a basket of currencies, not in terms of gold. The Montreal
Protocols 1-3 convert the limits under the Warsaw System to SDR. However, they
are not yet in force. In the meantime, the method of converting the franc into
national currency varies from country to country. See S.S. Pharm. Co., Ltd. v.
Qantas Airways, Ltd. (1989) 1 Lloyd's Rep. 319 (in dicta that the appropriate
method of conversion in Australia was the market price of gold at the date of
judgment) (appeal dismissed on other grounds).
23 See Hague Protocol, supra note 17, art. 22.
24 See IIA, supra note 1; MIA, supra note 5.
25 Under clause 1.2. or optional clause 11.2. carriers agree not to invoke the
defense under Article 20 on 100,000 SDR of a claim.
26 Under clause 1.1. carriers agree to waive the limits in Article 22 on claims for
compensatory damages arising from claims under Article 17.
27 See MIA, supra note 5, clause 1.1.
28 See id. clause 1.2.
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" Unlimited presumed liability above 100,000 SDR. This in-
volves waiver of the Article 22 per passenger limits;"9
* Optional law of domicile or permanent residence of passen-
ger. This involves adding a fifth jurisdiction to the plaintiffs
choices under Article 28;30
* Optional variation of 100,000 SDR limit according to route,
subject to government approval."'
The measures designed to achieve these reforms are discussed
in the following paragraphs. 2
B. ONLY ARTICLE 17 CLAIMS COVERED
The IATA Passenger Agreements apply only to claims for
damages for injury to passengers under Article 17. They do not
cover claims for loss or damage to baggage under Article 18 or
for delay under Article 19, both of which remain subject to the
usual convention provisions."3 However, it will be a rare case
where the amount at stake will justify litigation on the Article 20
best endeavors defense up to the limit, or to try and break the
limit for carrier misconduct under Article 25." However, these
will continue to be important practical issues for cargo, which is
also outside the LATA scheme.
C. WAIVER OF ARTICLE 20 BEST ENDEAVORS DEFENSE
Article 20 of the Warsaw System provides that the carrier is
not liable if it proves that all necessary measures were taken by it
and its agents to avoid the damage, or if it was impossible to take
such measures.3 5 Because of this defense, many authors charac-
terize carrier liability under the Warsaw System as presumed lia-
bility rather than strict liability. However, the defense is waived
in the United States under the Montreal Agreement and is lim-
ited or waived in several amendments of the Warsaw System,
which have not yet come into force.
This defense is akin to the principles of force majeure in con-
tract and inevitable accident in tort. To satisfy Article 20, the
29 See id. clause 1.1; Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 22.
30 See MIA, supra note 5, clause 11.1; Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 28.
31 See MIA, supra note 5, clause 11.2.
32 For an analysis of the issues in the U.S. Department of Transportation ap-
proval see Harakas, supra note 3, at 115-23. See also Caplan, supra note 7, at 132-
37.
33 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, arts. 18-19.
34 See id. arts. 20, 25.
35 See id. art. 20.
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range of avoidance measures required is all that were necessary,
not merely those which were desirable.36 The precise scope of
this defense remains uncertain, but it appears to arise in many
hijack and terrorism cases. There is also doubt over whether
the term "agents" includes independent contractors.
The IATA scheme removal of this defense for damages up to
100,000 SDR introduces a truly strict liability regime with pre-
sumed liability now operating only above that limit.
D. WAIVER OF ARTICLE 22 LIMITS
Not only have the limits imposed under Article 22 become
absurdly low, but the conversion of the gold franc measuring
unit into local currency is uncertain and the method varies from
country to country38 since the gold standard has been aban-
doned and replaced by the SDR. The SDR is defined in terms of
a basket of currencies, not in terms of gold. The Montreal Pro-
tocols 1-3 convert the limits under the Warsaw System to SDR.3 9
However, they are not yet in force.
The most radical part of the IATA scheme is the removal of
the Article 22 and Article 17 limits on liability. This marks the
coming of age of the aviation industry in terms of technical and
commercial responsibility. It will put pressure on long-standing
limited liability regimes in place for international road, rail, and
sea transport.
E. ARTICLE 25 Now IRRELEVANT
Article 25 of the Warsaw System provides plaintiffs with a
method of breaking the limits on liability by proving serious mis-
conduct of the carrier or its servants or agents. Under Warsaw,
"wilful misconduct" is required, whereas under Warsaw-Hague
the conduct must be intentional or done recklessly with knowl-
edge that damage would probably result.4 ° The Warsaw concept
applies in the United States where it has been used in extensive
litigation to break the limits on liability. The Warsaw-Hague
36 See id.
37 In Bornier v. Air Inter, Cass. civ. Ire. Fr., May 5,1982, 1983 R.F.D.A. 49, the
defense failed because the passengers had not been subject to a security check.
38 See, e.g., S.S. Pharm. Co., Ltd. v. Qantas Airways, Ltd. (1989) 1 Lloyds Rep.
319.
39 See Montreal Protocols 1-4, supra note 15.
40 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 25.
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concept is equally controversial with conflicting interpretations
on whether objective4' or subjective" knowledge is required.
One of the main aims of the IATA scheme is to avoid the in-
creasing cost, delay, and frustration of litigation in trying to es-
tablish misconduct 43 of the carrier to break the Article 22 limits.
With removal of the Article 22 limits on Article 17 damages,
such litigation will, in the future, be confined to cargo cases.
F. FIFTH JURISDICTION ADDED TO ARTICLE 28
Article 28 of the Warsaw System permits a plaintiff to choose
the courts of any of the following jurisdictions in which to bring
an action:
* the carrier's domicile;
* the carrier's principal place of business;
" the carrier's place of business through which the contract is
made; or
* the destination.
Proponents of the IATA scheme describe the addition of the
fifth jurisdiction in these terms:
This provision is key to assuring that passengers and their fami-
lies receive compensatory damages commensurate with their rea-
sonable expectations. The law of the passenger's domicile is the
law around which he or she made plans before the accident, the
law where (in the event of death), the estate will be probated and
where the passenger's survivors will most likely continue to live.44
Aviation is so widespread that it is impossible to reach a con-
sensus on a universal limit or absolute measure of damages for
death or personal injury. By adding the fifth jurisdiction, the
IATA scheme taps a formula that, in most cases, will be fairer
and more convenient. Unfortunately, there are some doubts
about its legality.
41 See S.S. Pharm. Co. Ltd. v Qantas Airways Ltd. (1991) 1 Lloyds Rep. 288.
42 See Goldman v. Thai Airways Int'l, Ltd., 1 W.L.R. 1186 (C.A. 1983).
43 "Wilful misconduct" under Warsaw is defined as "recklessly with intention."
See Hague Protocal, supra note 17, art. 20.
44 American Transport Association application to U.S. Department of Trans-
portation approval of the scheme.
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V. LEGAL BASIS OF THE SCHEME
A. CONTRACT WITH PASSENGER
Authority for the scheme comes from the Warsaw System Arti-
cle 22(1), which provides that, by special contract, the carrier
and passenger may agree upon a higher limit of liability. This
will usually be done through the passenger ticket, which, under
Article 3(2), is prima facie (but not conclusive) evidence of the
terms of the contract.4 5 The ordinary principles of contract law
will determine whether or not the MIA terms have been effec-
tively included in the contract. It will take some time before
knowledge of the terms is so widespread that notice is presumed
and even longer before they become part of the custom of the
trade. Many passengers are still not aware of the limits under
the Warsaw System. However, as the MIA terms are generally
more favorable to the passenger than the Warsaw System terms,
a passenger is unlikely to challenge the terms on this basis.
Could a carrier or its insurers avoid the MIA terms because
they have not been effectively incorporated into the contract on
ticket case principles, e.g., because the passenger has inade-
quate notice, language skills, age, or capacity? Passengers are
unlikely to make admissions against their own interest to assist
the carrier. Estoppel appears to require the passenger to have
knowledge of the terms that is similar to the knowledge re-
quired to incorporate the terms into the contract.
B. PASSENGER THIRD PARTY
Do the IIA and MIA provide a sufficient legal basis for the
special terms even if they are not incorporated into the contract
between carrier and passenger? This issue is especially impor-
tant between February 14, 1997, when the MIA was declared ef-
fective, and the date when each carrier:
(a) introduces the documents and systems to incorporate the
terms into their conditions of carriage and tariffs, and
(b) organizes insurance coverage for the increased liability.
The IIA is broad and in more general terms than the MIA. It
does not specify the 100,000 SDR threshold, which marks the
transition between strict and presumed liability under the
MIA.46 Nevertheless, the IIA does clearly establish the general
45 Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, § 2.
46 See 11A, supra note 1.
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agreement to waive the limit on liability.47 The further details
and agreed method are clearly established through the MIA.
However, these are agreements among carriers for the benefit
of passengers who are not themselves parties to the agreements.
Traditionally, privity of contract would prevent passengers from
suing directly on the agreements to enforce the rights in Eng-
land.48 This is to be contrasted with the long-standing position
in the United States,49 and more recently in Australia,5 ° where
passengers may well be able to enforce the rights even though
they are not parties to the agreement.5"
C. LEGALITY OF FIFTH JURISDICTION
Is the so-called fifth jurisdiction provision legal? 11A clause 1
and MIA optional clause I1.1. purport to allow the law of the
passenger's domicile to determine recoverable compensatory
damages.52 While this is likely to be fairer and more convenient
for the plaintiff passenger, it is not one of the four jurisdictions
from which the plaintiff must choose under Article 28. This ap-
pears to directly offend Article 32," which provides:
Any clause contained in the contract and all special agreements
entered into before the damage occurred by which the parties
purport to infringe the rules laid down by this Convention,
whether by deciding the law to be applied, or by altering the
rules as to jurisdiction, shall be null and void.54
Thus, it appears that a carrier or its insurers could avoid this
clause in the MIA even if it was agreed and included in their
conditions of carriage.
D. ARBITRATION
Another element of the IATA scheme provides for settlement
of claims by arbitration rather than by the normal courts.55 Arti-
cle 32 of the Warsaw System expressly permits arbitration clauses
47 See id.
48 See Beswick v. Beswick, 1967 App. Cas. 58.
49 See Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
50 See Trident Gen. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. McNeice Bros. Proprietary Ltd. (1988) 165
C.L.R. 107.
51 Consider also statutory provisions such as Property Law Act, 1974, § 55
(Austl.) which grant third party beneficiaries similar rights of enforcement.
52 See 11A, supra note 1; MIA, supra note 5.
53 Reinforced by Article 24.




for goods, but is silent on the point for passengers and bag-
gage.56 The strong implication is that it is not permitted for
them. Further analysis must await the release of details on the
arbitration scheme.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRAVEL AGENTS AND TOUR
OPERATORS
A. AGENTS OR PRINCIPALS
The law is unsettled on whether a tour operator or travel
agent acts as an agent or principal of the actual carrier.57 The
conflicting cases have been reconciled in the landmark decision
of the Privy Council, 58 which divided the cases into two catego-
ries. 9 Usually, the travel agent and tour operator are mere
agents of the carrier and/or passenger in the first category de-
scribed by the Privy Council. In the Privy Council's second cate-
gory, the travel agent or tour operator is found to be the
principal contractor who has undertaken to supply the services
that will often be performed by others as sub-contractors. More
and more package holidays are being construed in this way.
The second category is the norm in Europe where the E.C. Di-
rective on Package Holidays deems the travel agent or tour oper-
ator to be the principal in package holidays.60
B. WARSAW SYSTEM
If the travel agent or tour operator is merely acting as an
agent of the carrier (first category situation), then they are not a
party to the carrier's contract with the passenger and they can-
not be sued upon it.6 If the travel agent or tour operator are
sued, then they are entitled to limited liability under the Warsaw
System, provided they prove that they were acting within the
56 See id.
57 See T.C. Atherton, Package Holidays: Legal Aspects, 15 TOURISM MANAGEMENT
193-99 (1994).
58 See Wong Mee Wan v. Kwan Kin Travel Services Ltd. (1995) 4 All E.R. 745,
746.
59 See T.C. Atherton, Tour Operator's Responsibility for Package Holidays: Common
Law Takes the E.C. Directive Model Global, 3 TRAVEL L. J. 90-96 (1996).
60 See Wong Mee Wan, 4 All E.R. at 754-55.
61 See generally GREAT BRITAIN LAW COMMISSION, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: CON-
TRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PARTIES (1996).
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scope of their authority.6 2 Otherwise, their liability to the pas-
senger is determined by tort law.
If the travel agent or tour operator is acting as principal (sec-
ond category situation) who undertakes responsibility for the
entire journey, then they may become jointly and severally liable
to the passenger with the actual carrier at fault under Article 30
of the Warsaw System or under the Guadalajara Convention of
1961." : Article 30 applies where there are "successive carriers"
within the meaning of Article 1(3).64 The Guadalajara Conven-
tion has wider application.
C. GuADALAJARA CONVENTION
The Warsaw System rules and limits are further extended by
the Guadalajara Convention, which applies when the person
contracting as principal with the passenger (contracting car-
rier) 6 is different from the actual carrier providing the carriage
in whole or in part (actual carrier).66 This often arises in char-
ter, interlining, and package holiday situations. The Guadala-
jara Convention makes the contracting carrier liable jointly and
severally with the actual carrier and subject to the Warsaw Sys-
tem rules and limits.67 A travel agent or tour operator who con-
tracts with the passenger for air travel as principal (Privy
Council's second category discussed above) will be a contracting
carrier under the Guadalajara Convention.6"
If the Warsaw limits apply, then the travel agent and tour op-
erator are not at great risk. However, under Article 3, the acts
and omissions of an actual carrier are deemed to be those of a
travel agent or tour operator who is a contracting carrier. Thus,
if the Warsaw System limits do not apply because of failure to
provide the required documentation,69 or are broken because of
carrier misconduct,70 travel agents and tour operators in the sec-
ond category have unlimited liability for the acts and omissions
62 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 25; Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079,
1084-85 (2d. Cir. 1977).
63 See Guadalajara Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
64 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 30.
65 See Guadalajara Convention, supra note 12, art. 1(b).
66 See id. art. 1 (c) (expressly excluding a successive carrier covered by Warsaw
Convention arts. 1(3), 30).
67 See id. art. 2.
68 See id. art. 3.
611 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, arts. 3 (tickets), 4 (baggage checks).
70 See id. art. 25.
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of the actual carrier.71 This has been a concern for travel agents
and tour operators for some time.
D. IMPACT OF THE IATA SCHEME
When these principles are applied to the IATA scheme, the
travel agent and tour operator are placed at intolerable risk. It
appears that they, too, become liable to the passenger for the
actual carrier's waiver of limits and defenses under the Warsaw
System. The terms of Article 3(1), which makes the contracting
carrier liable for the acts or omissions of the actual carrier, is
similar to the terms of Article 3(2), which provides for the con-
verse. 72 However, Article 3(2) also provides: "[A]ny special
agreement under which the contracting carrier assumes obliga-
tions not imposed by the Warsaw Convention or any waiver of
rights conferred by that Convention ... shall not affect the ac-
tual carrier unless agreed to by him. 73
There is no such proviso to the contracting carrier's liability
for the actual carrier's acts or omissions under Article 3(1).
On a plain meaning interpretation of the provision, it appears
that the contracting carrier is liable on the terms set by the ac-
tual carrier.
This conclusion is reinforced if, as is usual, the travel agent's
or tour operator's brochure or contract with the passenger
states something to the effect of "the carriage of passengers and
baggage by the carrier is performed subject to the conditions of
carriage endorsed on the relevant travel tickets and documents
issued by the carrier."
Such a provision, which is designed to ensure that the car-
rier's limitation conditions apply to protect the travel agent and
tour operator, would have the effect of expressly binding them
to the carrier's waiver of Warsaw System limits and defenses
under the IATA scheme. Could the travel agent or tour opera-
tor alter this term to avoid responsibility for an actual carrier's
waiver of defenses or limits? This would be difficult to enforce
because Article 9 prohibits contracting out.75
71 See Guadalajara Convention, supra note 12, art. 3(1). (contracting carriers
are not given protection similar to that provided to actual carriers for their acts
or omissions under the proviso to Art 3(2)).
72 See Guadalajara Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.
71 Id. art. 3(2).
74 See id. art. 3(1).
75 See Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 9.
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Under Article 7 the passenger or the passenger's representa-
tives may sue the travel agent or tour operator with or without
suing the actual carrier. While any rights to indemnity against
the party at fault are preserved by Article X, this may be of little
comfort if the actual carrier or its insurer is unable or unwilling
to pay. At the least, travel agents and tour operators should in-
sist that the actual carrier is insured and that the policy is ex-
tended to cover the contracting carrier. However, the innocent
travel agent and tour operator are still likely to be left with un-
reimbursed legal costs and some risk of bearing unlimited liabil-
ity. Thus, the position of a travel agent or tour operator acting
as a principal is unsatisfactory under the scheme as presently
structured.
VII. CONCLUSION
The IATA scheme is a radical private sector initiative designed
to reform some of the key problems of the Warsaw System. It
introduces a uniform strict liability of 100,000 SDR per passen-
ger and unlimited presumed liability. It waives the best endeav-
ors defense under Article 20 and it renders litigation to break
the limit by proving carrier misconduct under Article 25 unnec-
essary. It offers passengers the fairest and most convenient
choice of the law of their residence or domicile to determine
recoverable compensatory damages. These are solutions to
problems that have floundered in inter-governmental multi-lat-
eral negotiations for decades.
As in all efforts at self-regulation, IATA is constrained by the
legal framework in place for the industry. This limits the effec-
tiveness of some of the reforms for carriers and passengers. On
the one hand, the scheme is underway even before some carri-
ers have their insurance and other arrangements in place. On
the other hand, it will always be difficult to ensure that the MIA
terms become part of every carriage contract. There are doubts
about the legality of the fifth jurisdiction and arbitration under
the Warsaw System. The scheme opens up unexpected and un-
welcome risks for travel agents and tour operators that their rep-
resentative bodies need to address urgently.
Some of these problems will be difficult to resolve within the
constraints of the existing legal framework. The neatest solu-
tion is for the state parties to the Warsaw System to formulate
and implement an urgent protocol to make adjustments to the
legal framework necessary to facilitate the IATA scheme of re-
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forms. Unfortunately, judging from past form, this takes a long
time, it takes us back to the beginning of the problems.
Nevertheless, the IATA scheme is a great leap forward; it is a
fair and widely accepted model for reform. It is being imple-
mented right now, and the problems will be resolved as well as
can be done along the way. This places enormous pressure on
state parties to the Warsaw System to catch up.
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